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RANDY J. KOZEL* 
Abstract: Sometimes government operates by inducement rather than order. Con-
gress distributes money to the states. A state grants funds to nonprofit organiza-
tions. An administrative agency offers wages and professional opportunities to its 
staff. A high school provides instruction to its students. In each situation, the gov-
ernment furnishes something of value. And in each situation, it asks something in 
return—whether implementation of a government program, forbearance from ac-
tivities deemed inconsistent with operational goals, conduct in pursuit of an em-
ployment mission, or compliance with standards of academic discipline. Though 
they arise in different contexts, these varied forms of government action present the 
same core question of constitutional justification. The issue in each case is the ex-
tent of the government’s power to bargain for what it does not, will not, or cannot 
demand. It is beyond dispute that state and federal governments have broad au-
thority to implement policy through inducements. It is just as clear that there are 
limits on what governments may buy. As it has explored those limits in recent 
years, the Supreme Court has turned repeatedly to the concept of leverage: the gov-
ernment’s exploitation of a public asset to influence unrelated behavior.  
INTRODUCTION 
Government regularly operates through requests rather than orders. Con-
gress might ask the states to reconsider certain laws, irrespective of whether it 
could compel them to do so.1 A federal or state government might ask nonprof-
it organizations to embrace a particular social policy, even if it could not de-
mand adherence to that policy.2 A public employer might ask that its staff not 
speak controversially at work, even if the employees’ speech would be pro-
tected by the First Amendment if uttered in the public square.3 And so on. 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2021, Randy J. Kozel. All rights reserved. 
 * Diane & M.O. Miller II Research Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Develop-
ment and Academic Affairs, Notre Dame Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, 
thanks to A.J. Bellia, Emily Bremer, Marc DeGirolami, Nicole Garnett, Richard Garnett, Philip Ham-
burger, Bruce Huber, Lloyd Mayer, Alex Tsesis, and Chris Walker. Meghan Dalton and William 
Ringhofer provided excellent research assistance. 
 1 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (dealing with laws involving the purchase 
of alcohol). 
 2 See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 208 (2013) (dealing 
with a policy requirement relating to prostitution and sex trafficking). 
 3 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (dealing with a dispute over speech related to a 
workplace grievance). 
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Sometimes these requests come with sweeteners that increase the likeli-
hood of a favorable response. Congress offers financial incentives to the 
states.4 Likewise, federal and state governments entice nonprofit organizations 
with subsidies.5 And public employers offer wages and professional benefits.6 
Still, the Constitution imposes limits even when the government acts through 
incentives rather than orders. While public officials have considerable leeway 
to execute their operational initiatives, they “may not deny a benefit to a per-
son on a basis that infringes his” constitutional rights, regardless of whether 
the person has any “entitlement to that benefit.”7 A related set of limitations 
prevents the federal government from going too far in influencing the states.8 
Across both contexts, the Supreme Court has remained vigilant even while 
acknowledging the added discretion that attends the use of inducements. 
The analytical terrain for working out this tension is the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions, which is potentially in play whenever the govern-
ment offers a benefit subject to qualifications. My aim in this Article is to pro-
vide an account of unconstitutional conditions doctrine that is focused on the 
concept of leverage: the government’s use of an asset to extract an unrelated 
concession. The case law suggests that when there is too severe a mismatch 
between the benefit the government is offering and the burden it seeks to im-
pose, its action may violate the prohibition against improper leverage. 
Even among the darkest corridors of constitutional law, the doctrine (or, 
perhaps more accurately given its wide sweep, “metadoctrine”)9 of unconstitu-
tional conditions is famously opaque.10 Notwithstanding decades of attention 
from scholars, the doctrine continues to “roam[] about constitutional law like 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (involving federal grants to participating states). 
 5 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (involving grants to private organizations). 
 6 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (involving a First Amendment dispute in the context of an em-
ployment relationship). 
 7 United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (noting that the “government may not grant a bene-
fit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may 
withhold that benefit altogether”). 
 8 See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (observing that the congressional “spending power is . . . not 
unlimited,” but rather is “subject to several general restrictions articulated in our cases”). 
 9 Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional 
Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 1002 (1995). 
 10 For evocative descriptions of the state of the doctrine, see, for example, Daniel A. Farber, An-
other View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. STATE U. L. 
REV. 913, 914 (2006) (referring to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as an “intellectual and 
doctrinal swamp”); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 
VA. L. REV. 479, 487 (2012) (contending that “[t]he cases on unconstitutional conditions are so poorly 
conceptualized that they cannot provide more than rough support for any theory of such conditions”). 
112 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:109 
Banquo’s ghost,” 11 without a clear sense of definition or direction. Uncertainty 
abounds over what the doctrine is,12 what it ought to be,13 and whether it 
should exist in the first place.14 All the while, government spending programs 
continue to “alter[] the shape of the federal system.”15 
In the context of federal programs, the search for guiding principles be-
gins with Article I of the Constitution and its enumeration of congressional 
powers.16 Congress’s spending authority is broad, extending to initiatives in 
pursuit of the “general Welfare.”17 But the Supreme Court has insisted that 
conditions on federal funds must, among other things, relate to the program in 
question and stop short of coercion.18 Conditions that fail these tests exceed 
Congress’s authority under Article I. 
The Constitution also restricts the imposition of conditions, whether by 
the federal government or by the states, in another way. The guarantees of in-
dividual liberty and limited government do not disintegrate simply because 
public officials operate via inducement rather than order. The cases teach that 
government power to impose conditions is limited by bona fide operational 
need. The government may place conditions on the distribution of its resources 
to ensure that public programs, instrumentalities, and initiatives function as 
intended. Yet it may not go further by using public assets to influence conduct 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, 
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–11 (1988). 
 12 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in 
the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1316 (2013) (“[I]f a doctrine is a 
set of rules or tests, then there is no such doctrine—at least none with more than trivial content.”); 
Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implica-
tions of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 68 (2013) 
(“There are plenty of ideas. It is just that there are no set doctrines for analyzing the question.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats Versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution 
to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
503, 544 (2016) (defending an approach based on predicting how the government would have be-
haved if it could not have insisted on adding the conditions at issue).  
 14 See Schauer, supra note 9, at 990 (considering an approach to unconstitutional conditions prob-
lems that recognizes them as “irredeemably intractable” and “questions of degree” that are incapable 
of resolution through the invocation of “coherent principles and usable doctrines”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 338 (1989) (criticiz-
ing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as “far too crude and general a way to address the mul-
tiple possible collisions between constitutional protections and the modern regulatory state”). 
 15 Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 847, 874 (1979). 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 
1933 (1995) (referring to coercion and germaneness as the “most promising constraints on Congress’s 
spending power” emerging from the Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987)). 
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disconnected from its operational goals—even if the recipients agree to the 
stipulated terms.19 
In exploring these limits, the cases and commentary have paid considera-
ble attention to whether coercion is afoot.20 Despite its prominence, the coer-
cion inquiry faces significant challenges. In every unconstitutional conditions 
case, the state, individual, or organization to whom a benefit is offered has the 
power to decline. It is not enough, then, to ask whether the offeree truly had no 
choice. The operative question is whether the choice the offeree did have was 
so constrained as to be legally irrelevant. Conducting the latter inquiry requires 
grappling with complex ideas of volition, compulsion, and assent. Unsurpris-
ingly, those concepts have proved difficult for the judiciary to translate into 
workable rules. 
Some cases move beyond coercion to examine the relationship between 
the benefit on offer and the concession sought in return. As I will explain, 
when benefits and burdens are unrelated, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
government action as the product of impermissible leveraging. But the Court 
has not provided a full account of how and why the use of leverage is relevant 
as a constitutional matter. 
The need for further analysis is all the more salient because leverage lies 
at the core of some of the Supreme Court’s most important engagements with 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Perhaps most notably, leverage played 
a key role when the Court invalidated Congress’s proposed expansion of Med-
icaid in the Affordable Care Act.21 The concept of leverage also animates cases 
on everything from the funding of nonprofit agencies, to the taking of private 
property, to the restriction of expressive liberty in public workplaces and in 
public schools. 
In an era of enormous government spending and ubiquitous government 
programming,22 it is crucial to define the limits on the purchase and sale of 
constitutional rights.23 To be useful, the guiding principles must move beyond 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“The First Amendment limits the 
ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict . . . the liberties em-
ployees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.”). 
 20 See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013) (describing 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as “vindicat[ing] the Constitution’s enumerated rights by 
preventing the government from coercing people into giving them up”). 
 21 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
(“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in [a] new pro-
gram by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”). 
 22 Cf. Hamburger, supra note 10, at 490 (noting that “the federal government governs not merely 
by force of law, but increasingly by contract”); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem 
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1984) (“The greatest force of a 
modern government lies in its power to regulate access to scarce resources.”). 
 23 See Farber, supra note 10, at 915 (addressing the alienability of many constitutional rights). 
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the vexing distinction between actions that are legally voluntary and actions 
that are coerced. The concept of leverage can aid in that enterprise, so long as 
its contours are well-defined and its implications are fully understood. 
This Article analyzes leverage as a constitutional concept. It explains how 
government inducements can raise leverage concerns across a variety of do-
mains. It also examines arguments that leverage leads to deleterious effects, 
including the facilitation of government overreach, the reduction of transpar-
ency, and the erosion of political equality. 
Part I provides historical and doctrinal context for evaluating government 
attempts to influence behavior through inducements rather than orders. The 
Part also explains how the government’s vast resources, along with its pen-
chant for imposing conditions on the use of those resources, can raise concerns 
about unchecked discretion. Part II examines the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions as a response to these concerns.24 Part III highlights ways in which 
the concept of leverage animates the law of unconstitutional conditions. With 
those illustrations in mind, Part IV explores the theoretical bases for treating 
leverage as a key component of unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
I. IN SEARCH OF LEGAL LIMITS 
The federal government and the states possess considerable authority to en-
courage actions they cannot compel. Encouragement tends to occur through the 
offer of benefits. While the terms can be enticing, they lack the compulsory, un-
flinching force of government mandates. Whether it is Congress offering bene-
fits to the states or a state offering benefits to private parties, the offeree’s ability 
to say no diminishes concerns about government imposition of orthodoxy. 
Diminishes, but does not eliminate. While the judiciary has acknowledged 
the power of federal and state governments to offer inducements in pursuit of 
policy objectives, it has also recognized the need for limits. An inducement can 
violate the Constitution even if the offeree retains the power to walk away. 
This Part examines the sources of governmental authority to act via in-
ducements, as well as judicial efforts to articulate constitutional limits that pre-
serve the balance between federal power, state sovereignty, and individual lib-
erty. After beginning with the congressional spending power, the Part moves 
on to consider several other ways that unconstitutional conditions problems 
can arise at the state and federal levels. 
                                                                                                                           
 24 The focus of this Article is the U.S. Constitution. I do not address the impact of state constitu-
tions on the lawfulness of conditions. 
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A. The Spending Power 
1. Origins 
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to “lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”25 Controversy 
surrounding the powers to tax and spend is as old as the country itself.26 There 
is a robust literature on the history of those powers, and there is no need to re-
count it here.27 For present purposes, let us focus on an especially prominent 
aspect of the historical debate over federal spending. On one side is the posi-
tion championed by James Madison, who maintained that Article I’s reference 
to taxing and spending is not an independent source of governmental authority 
to act. If Congress wishes to lay taxes and spend funds in pursuit of a particu-
lar goal, it needs to identify a separate, enumerated power to justify its ac-
tion.28 
Madison’s view was not universally held. The competing perspective is 
often associated with Alexander Hamilton, who defended vast congressional 
authority to tax and spend. While the precise nature of Hamilton’s position is a 
matter of some dispute,29 the Supreme Court has described him as arguing that 
the power to tax and spend extends beyond the enumerated powers given to 
Congress elsewhere in the Constitution.30 If Congress is taxing and spending in 
                                                                                                                           
 25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1; see also Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending 
Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (observing that although the 
Constitution does not contain an express “Spending Clause,” there is nevertheless a “settled” under-
standing that “the national legislature may spend money . . . to ‘provide for . . . the general Welfare of 
the United States’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1)). 
 26 See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending 
Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 511–15 (2009) (describing debates in early American history over 
the spending power). 
 27 See id.; Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 125 (2010); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 
DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1994); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An 
Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003). 
 28 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936); see also Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, 
Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever 
Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 524 (2003) (describing “the Madisonian idea 
that Congress may not spend to achieve ends it could not achieve through its other enumerated pow-
ers”). 
 29 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 27, at 3 (criticizing Supreme Court opinions as displaying a 
“profound misunderstanding” of Hamilton’s position). 
 30 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66. 
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pursuit of the general welfare, there is no need to point to any other source of 
authority.31 
Hamilton’s argument won out. In 1936, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Congress’s authority to tax and spend operates independently of Article I’s other 
enumerated powers.32 While the Court added a limitation that congressional ac-
tion may not “invade[] the reserved rights of the states,”33 that restriction soon 
gave way, reflecting a capacious understanding of permissible taxing and spend-
ing.34 The Court would underscore the point years later, reiterating that while 
Madison’s view “has not been lacking in adherents,” the Hamiltonian position 
had “prevailed.”35 The result was an extensive, though not boundless, power to 
tax and spend in pursuit of a wide range of congressional objectives. 
2. Evolution 
The Hamiltonian conception of the spending power has persisted.36 The 
Supreme Court continues to describe Article I as affording “Congress broad 
discretion to tax and spend” in pursuit of federal objectives.37 Because it is im-
possible to design effective spending programs without placing at least some 
conditions on the use of government funds, those conditions are usually per-
missible, too.38 
Even so, the Court has identified constraints on how Congress may use 
public resources to implement policy. Those constraints do not flow from the 
requirement that, as advocated by Madison, spending must be linked to another 
power enumerated in Article I. Rather, the limits deal with the manner in which 
Congress exercises its authority. 
The Court set forth a framework for analysis in South Dakota v. Dole, a 
1987 case dealing with drinking age laws.39 South Dakota had allowed nine-
teen-year-olds to buy certain types of beer.40 Congress, by contrast, favored 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See id. Joseph Story’s view has been described as in accord. See Natelson, supra note 27, at 9 
(describing the “Hamilton-Story view” as treating Congress’s spending authority as “independent” of 
its other enumerated powers). 
 32 Butler, 297 U.S. at 66. 
 33 Id. at 68. 
 34 See Engdahl, supra note 27, at 39–40 (noting the evolution of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
enumerated federal powers and “the reserved power of the states,” albeit while disputing the accuracy 
of the Supreme Court’s depictions of Hamilton’s position). 
 35 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). 
 36 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  
 37 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013). 
 38 Id.; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991) (recognizing congressional authori-
ty to control the manner in which public funds are used). 
 39 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 40 Id. at 205. 
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laws that prohibited purchases of alcohol by anyone under twenty-one.41 In 
promoting its preferred policy, Congress did not attempt to order states like 
South Dakota to comply with federal policy.42 It used financial incentives in-
stead. A statute directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a portion 
of federal highway funds from states that set the minimum age for buying al-
cohol lower than Congress wished.43 
By upholding the program under review, Dole underscored Congress’s 
authority to place conditions on the use of funds.44 The case also reaffirmed a 
view of the spending power as an independent justification for legislative ac-
tion.45 Nevertheless, Dole noted the existence of constitutional constraints. 
Some of those constraints are relatively easy to overcome. For example, while 
federal spending must pursue the general welfare, Congress receives substan-
tial deference in determining what that concept entails.46 Likewise, conditions 
on federal funds must be clear to ensure that offerees understand what Con-
gress is offering and what it is asking in return.47 
Two aspects of the Dole test pose higher hurdles for Congress to clear. 
The first is the line between permissible “inducement” and impermissible 
“compulsion.”48 Dole recognized this distinction as crucial to the constitution-
ality of federal spending initiatives.49 In the program at issue in Dole, Congress 
stayed on the proper side of the line—which is to say, it induced but did not 
compel—because states that maintained a lower drinking age stood to lose a 
relatively small amount of money.50 To be sure, states might face some “temp-
tation” to abide by Congress’s wishes in order to receive federal dollars.51 But 
temptation is different from coercion, and the difference is stark enough to af-
fect the constitutional calculus.52 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. 
 42 The Supreme Court did not determine whether Congress could have dispensed with the spend-
ing program and chosen instead to enact a national drinking age through direct, compulsory legisla-
tion. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. 
 43 Id. at 205. 
 44 Id. at 206. 
 45 See id. at 207 (“[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’ 
. . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of 
federal funds.” (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936))). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“There can . . . 
be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is 
expected of it.”). 
 48 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 589–90). 
 52 See id. at 211–12. 
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The Dole Court did not fashion a rule for determining when a state has 
the ability to refuse federal money “in fact” as opposed to merely “in theory.”53 
Instead, it adopted a fact-specific approach focused on the case at hand. As we 
will see, the Court has continued that practice, including in its engagement 
with the Affordable Care Act a quarter century after Dole. 
Dole also identified another safeguard against congressional overreach, 
one which had appeared in prior cases “without significant elaboration.”54 The 
Court explained that conditions on federal funds must be related—which is to 
say, “germane[]”—to the government program in question.55 Conditions that 
are too remote exceed Congress’s spending authority. At issue in Dole was 
whether highway funds are connected tightly enough to drinking age laws to 
satisfy the Constitution. 
The Dole majority said yes. Though money for highways might, at first 
glance, appear disconnected from laws regarding the purchase of alcohol, the 
Court saw Congress’s programmatic goal as the promotion of “safe interstate 
travel.”56 Variations in drinking ages between states frustrated that objective by 
encouraging young people to drive from one state to another to purchase alco-
hol. Congress sought to remove the “incentive to drink and drive” as a means 
of promoting its travel-related goal.57 
Justice O’Connor rejected this conclusion, finding the connection be-
tween drinking ages and highway funding too attenuated to pass constitutional 
muster.58 She explained that drunk driving and underage drinking are separate 
problems that cannot be lumped together under the heading of safe travel. Jus-
tice O’Connor accepted the majority’s basic analytical approach, describing 
her disagreement as a matter of “application” rather than a dispute about con-
stitutional principles.59 Still, she worried that without a more rigorous method 
of ensuring that funding conditions really are related to the behaviors they in-
centivize, Congress might come to possess the power to “regulate almost any 
area of a State’s social, political, or economic life.”60 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 207. 
 55 Id. (“[O]ur cases have suggested . . . that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if 
they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’” (quoting Mas-
sachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion))); see id. at 208 n.3 (noting 
that the Court’s prior cases “have not required that we define the outer bounds of the ‘germaneness’ or 
‘relatedness’ limitation on the imposition of conditions under the spending power”). 
 56 Id. at 208. 
 57 Id. at 209. 
 58 Id. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 59 Id. at 213. 
 60 Id. at 215. 
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3. Enduring Debates 
In Dole, the Supreme Court described how Congress faces constitutional 
constraints even when it acts through inducements rather than orders. Condi-
tions on federal funds may not be coercive, nor may they be too far removed 
from the objectives of the spending program at issue. Nevertheless, the Dole 
Court saw no constitutional infirmity on the facts before it, raising questions 
about how stringent the limits it articulated really are.61 
The answers would not be forthcoming any time soon. After Dole’s issu-
ance, the Supreme Court occasionally mentioned the case, but without much 
elaboration of its implications or animating principles. In 1991, for example, 
the Court cited Dole for the proposition that, “absent coercion,” states possess 
the ability to protect their own interests—and, thus, the discretion to say yes or 
no to federal requests.62 The Court also reinforced the need for a link between 
federal funds and their attendant conditions, lest the spending power “render 
academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal authority.”63 And 
when the Court discussed coercion in a 1999 case involving state sovereign 
immunity, it reiterated that Congress can reward states for taking actions it 
lacks the power to decree, so long as there is no coercion afoot.64 The Court 
thus continued to reaffirm both the broad nature of the spending power and the 
presence of legal limits. Yet it did not devote much attention to developing the 
existing doctrine or its conceptual foundations.65 
In 2012, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)66 
brought the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act—a major initiative with 
wide-ranging political implications—before the Supreme Court.67 The most 
prominent aspect of the case involved the Act’s “individual mandate,” which 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 339, 366 (referring to the Supreme “Court’s failure for twenty-five years after Dole to put teeth 
in any of that decision’s requirements”); cf. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 88 
(2011) (observing that Congress “bargains with a relatively free hand under the spending power, but 
the doctrine still yields points of uncertainty”). 
 62 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 
252, 271 (1991). 
 63 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
 64 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87 
(1999). 
 65 See Coan, supra note 61, at 348 (arguing that the “consensus view of commentators, supported 
by twenty-five years of decisions following Dole, was that the decision represented a blank check to 
Congress”). 
 66 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 67 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and Dis-
dain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (2012) (describing NFIB as “largely upholding the central legislative 
achievement of the Obama Administration—the Affordable Care Act”). 
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required people to carry certain levels of health insurance coverage.68 In a frac-
tured set of opinions, five Justices concluded that the mandate was permissible. 
The pivotal opinion was that of Chief Justice Roberts, who treated the mandate 
as an exercise of Congress’s power to lay and collect taxes.69 
The individual mandate was only one part of the Affordable Care Act. 
Another part met a different fate. The Act made substantial changes to the 
Medicaid program, pursuant to which states receive federal assistance in pay-
ing for certain medical services.70 One of Congress’s aims was to encourage 
states to expand Medicaid coverage to include more people.71 
Part of the controversy surrounding the individual mandate was whether it 
operated as a compulsion or rather a tax incentive. There was no need for such 
debate with respect to the Medicaid expansion, which Congress designed as an 
offer instead of a demand. Each state could decide whether to expand its Medi-
caid program in line with Congress’s wishes. If a state agreed to the expansion, 
it would receive additional federal funds. If it refused, no extra funds would be 
forthcoming. But there was another consequence: any state that failed to expand 
coverage would relinquish the existing funding it received from the federal gov-
ernment to support Medicaid expenditures.72 By the time of NFIB, those funds 
had come to “constitut[e] over 10 percent of most States’ total revenue.”73 
Seven Justices concluded that the Medicaid expansion went too far, repre-
senting an improper use of Congress’s spending power. Justice Scalia wrote 
for four Justices and emphasized the sheer number of dollars at stake.74 By 
contrast, for Chief Justice Roberts and the two Justices who joined him, it was 
not only the amount of money that mattered. It was also relevant that Congress 
had made eligibility for existing funds dependent on a state’s willingness to do 
something—namely, provide expanded coverage—unrelated to those funds.75 
In doctrinal terms, the Medicaid issue in NFIB called to mind Dole, albeit 
on a larger scale. The line between inducement and coercion again proved im-
portant, as did the connection between spending conditions and the programs 
to which they attach. And just as it did in Dole, the Court resolved the dispute 
                                                                                                                           
 68 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 530–31. 
 69 See id. at 563 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that “every reasonable construction must be 
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 
U.S. 648, 657 (1895))). 
 70 Id. at 541 (majority opinion). 
 71 Id. at 542. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 684–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Congress had threatened “to with-
hold $233 billion, equaling 21.86% of all state expenditures combined”). 
 75 See id. at 580 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (reasoning that when 
“conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions 
are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes”). 
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before it without elaborating on the contours or underpinnings of the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged as 
much in noting that he saw no need to “fix a line” between inducement and 
coercion.76 NFIB thus stands as a recent illustration of the longstanding tension 
between congressional authority to offer inducements and the Constitution’s 
creation of a federal government of limited powers. 
B. Beyond Article I 
In cases like Dole and NFIB, the Supreme Court evaluated the lawfulness 
of government programs through the lens of Article I. The question in those 
cases was whether the spending power allows Congress to impose the condi-
tions in question.77 
The Spending Clause is not the only constitutional provision that informs 
the legality of government inducements. The Supreme Court also asks whether 
conditions are invalid because they infringe protected liberties. This question 
significantly expands the inquiry into the legality of government inducements. 
Every time a state or federal employer imposes a condition on the speech of its 
employees, it uses a public asset to discourage the exercise of constitutional 
rights.78 So, too, when a government offers public education on condition that 
students refrain from activities deemed inconsistent with the educational enter-
prise.79 The same is true when a government provides tax advantages contin-
gent on the avoidance of disqualifying speech or conduct,80 or when it permits 
a homeowner to alter her property only if she agrees to give the government 
something in return.81 
The constitutional provisions implicated by these arrangements differ 
from case to case. A condition that requires a property owner to grant an ease-
ment implicates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. A condition that links 
public employment to speech restrictions raises First Amendment questions, as 
does a condition that gives broadcasters federal funds only if they agree not to 
editorialize.  
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. at 585. 
 77 See, e.g., id. at 577–78 (cautioning that when “‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation 
runs contrary to our system of federalism” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937))). 
 78 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (dealing with speech restrictions in the 
employment context). 
 79 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (dealing with speech restrictions in 
public schools). 
 80 See, e.g., Regan v. Tax’n with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (considering tax bene-
fits that were contingent on the recipient’s willingness to refrain from certain speech). 
 81 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
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While the relevant constitutional provisions differ, the dynamics of the 
problem are the same. In each situation, a state or federal government offers 
some sort of benefit, from plain old cash to free education to the authority to 
alter real property. In each situation, it would be easy enough to say there is no 
possibility of deprivation, because the government making the offer is not 
strictly requiring anything. As a result, it should be up to the offeree to accept 
or reject the proposed exchange. Moreover, the argument continues, one can-
not accept the government’s offer while changing the terms. The offeree may 
accept the benefit along with the conditions, or it may decline. That is where 
the options run out. 
A complementary line of reasoning runs from the perspective of the gov-
ernment making the offer. If a government is not required to offer a benefit, it 
should have discretion to make that benefit available only on specified terms. 
This position draws on the relationship between greater powers and lesser 
powers.82 For example, because the federal government has the greater power 
to refrain from giving the states any highway funding, it also has the lesser 
power to provide highway funding subject to certain conditions.83 The princi-
ple holds across a range of public assets, and it applies whether the offeror is 
the federal government or a state. 
The Supreme Court has rejected both strands of this argument. To the 
claim that offerees always have the option to walk away, the Court has re-
sponded that a right of refusal does not necessarily insulate the government’s 
action from challenge. To the claim that a government with power to deny a 
benefit altogether may dictate the terms on which the benefit is available, the 
Court has responded that as a constitutional matter, a greater power does not 
necessarily include all lesser ones.84 
Even if the Court is correct that neither the offeree’s right to refuse nor 
the offeror’s power to withhold is dispositive, its rejection of those arguments 
warrants further analysis. The Court’s approach depends on the articulation of 
guiding principles that empower governments to achieve their operational ob-
jectives without allowing them to use their massive resources in ways that un-
                                                                                                                           
 82 On the relationship between unconstitutional conditions doctrine and greater-includes-the-
lesser reasoning, see, for example, Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 
728 (2002). 
 83 Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (addressing conditions on the availability 
of federal highway funds). 
 84 See Berman, supra note 82, at 728 (describing cases that rejected “the government’s claim that 
the greater power to withhold the benefit . . . includes the lesser power to condition the benefit on the 
offeree’s waiver of a constitutional right”). For a suggestion from the early twentieth century that the 
Court has not always been consistent on this point, see Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions 
and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 321 (1935). 
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dermine the federal-state balance or corrode individual liberty. The pursuit of 
such principles has led time and again to the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions. Yet as the next Part explains, the doctrine continues to generate more 
questions than answers. 
II. GOVERNMENT BY INDUCEMENT 
The government needs flexibility to pursue goals the people set for it. If a 
public instrumentality hires workers to promote its operational objectives, it 
must possess some discretion to manage its employees’ actions through re-
strictions that might be unlawful if imposed on other citizens.85 If the federal 
government offers grants to states or private entities in pursuit of defined poli-
cy outcomes, it must possess some discretion to control the recipients’ use of 
funds.86  
Yet there are risks to affording the government too much leeway when it 
acts through inducements. Federal and state governments have enormous fi-
nancial footprints and play a central role in countless domains of modern life.87 
Giving public officials unchecked discretion to impose conditions could dis-
rupt the federal-state balance, diminish personal liberty, and alter the constitu-
tional order. 
This is the state of play for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.88 
The doctrine arises in a variety of contexts and has prompted examination by 
numerous constitutional theorists. But the core idea is simple. Some conditions 
on government benefits are constitutionally problematic, even if the recipients 
could have turned down the government’s offer. Private individuals and organ-
izations have grounds to challenge certain conditions even if they hold no “en-
titlement” to the benefits at issue.89 Further, states may challenge certain con-
ditions imposed by the federal government even if the conditions attach to 
benefits that the federal government has no obligation to provide. 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (recognizing the government’s distinctive 
operational needs when it manages a workplace). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Hamburger, supra note 10, at 490 (noting the proliferation of governance “not merely by 
force of law, but increasingly by contract”). 
 88 For a recent depiction of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine from the Supreme Court, see 
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377 n.4 (2018) 
(describing the doctrine as preventing “the Government from using conditions ‘to produce a result 
which it could not command directly’” (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))). 
 89 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013) (quoting 
Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)); see also Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (observing that “[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of 
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or 
privilege”).  
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The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions makes clear that government 
action warrants judicial scrutiny despite taking the form of inducement. The 
question is how to determine which arrangements are lawful and which are not. 
This Part introduces several prominent theories for explaining and apply-
ing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, with special attention to the 
inquiry into coercion. 
A. Theories of Unconstitutional Conditions 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, charged with safeguarding 
liberty in the face of government’s ubiquitous programming and extraordinary 
resources, is famously murky.90 It has been described as resting on distinctions 
that are “hardly clear” and “not always self-evident.” And that was by the Su-
preme Court, as recently as 2013.91 Scholars have been critical, too.92 Yet some 
version of the doctrine is necessary to ensure that governments cannot circum-
vent constitutional imperatives simply by purporting to ask rather than tell. 
Toward that end, commentators have advanced a variety of insightful the-
ories to develop the doctrine. One view, championed by Richard Epstein, de-
picts the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a second-best mechanism 
for restricting the vast power of government under modern judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution.93 A different account, developed by Kathleen Sulli-
van, examines the distributive impact of conditions not only on the relationship 
between government and individual, but also on the relative welfare of people 
with differing levels of dependence on government support.94 Lynn Baker 
likewise emphasizes equality in her analysis of the Supreme Court’s cases in-
volving public assistance benefits.95 And Einer Elhauge evaluates conditions 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 11, at 6 (describing the problem of unconstitutional conditions as 
a “basic structural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled courts and commentators alike”). 
 91 Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 U.S. at 215, 217. 
 92 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 12, at 1316; Cox & Samaha, supra note 12, at 68. 
 93 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 28; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. 
REV. 593, 599 (1990) (discussing Professor Epstein’s description of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine as a “second-best surrogate” for other limitations on government power). 
 94 See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 1490. 
 95 See Lynn A. Baker, Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1188 (1990) (arguing that with respect to public assistance benefits, 
the Supreme “Court declines to defer to the legislature only when the challenged condition requires 
persons unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit, to pay a 
higher price to exercise their constitutional rights than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence 
income”). 
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based on whether the government would proceed with its program if its pre-
ferred conditions were impermissible.96 
Each of these inquiries is valuable in its own right, and each illuminates 
an important feature of the unconstitutional conditions problem: the govern-
ment’s accumulation of power, the erosion of individual liberty, the extent to 
which conditions are essential to the program in question, and so on. But not-
withstanding the instructive body of scholarship on unconstitutional conditions 
by these and other commentators, the doctrine remains underdeveloped in the 
case law. The Supreme Court has refrained from any effort to “fix” the doc-
trine’s contours.97 Instead, the Court has focused on two concerns and asked 
whether they are acute enough to invalidate the program under review. The 
first of those concerns, discussed in the following Section, deals with whether 
assent to a government condition is truly voluntary. The second concern, to 
which I turn in the subsequent Part, involves government attempts to use an 
inducement as leverage to achieve an unrelated goal. 
B. The Special Role of Coercion 
It is possible to imagine a rule that treats federal spending conditions as 
valid provided that they promote the general welfare.98 No private citizen or 
organization could be required to accept a government benefit. Nor could any 
state be required to accept federal disbursements. But if private parties or states 
wanted the benefits the federal government was offering, they could not com-
plain about the terms. Their options would be limited to “yes” or “no 
thanks.”99  
The prospect of coercion complicates this approach. As Mitchell Berman 
has explained, the coercion inquiry rests on the idea that courts should look 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Elhauge, supra note 13, at 503–04. For Professor Elhauge, the core question is hypothetical: If 
the government could not have imposed the condition at issue, would it have preferred to withhold the 
benefit entirely, or rather to make the benefit available without the condition? See id. at 507. If the 
government would have furnished the benefit even without the condition, its threat to withhold the 
benefit is “contrived,” and thus invalid. Id. at 508–09. If the government would have withheld the 
benefit rather than grant it without the condition, the condition is permissible. 
 97 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J.); cf. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 215 (2013) (stating 
that the line between conditions that define the contours of a government program and conditions that 
seek to influence speech outside the relevant program is “hardly clear”). 
 98 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting to Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”). 
 99 See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 579 (“The States are separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes 
they have to act like it.”). 
126 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:109 
beyond the simple fact of assent when there is reason to suspect that assent 
was wrongfully induced.100 
In unpacking the concept of coercion, the first step is definitional. Efforts 
at definition are not purely “empirical,” for they draw on philosophical debates 
about the nature of volition and consent.101 As a first cut, we might think of 
coercion as occurring when the government insists on a condition that the of-
feree “could not, as a practical matter, reject.”102 With respect to federal grants, 
the amount of money at stake might be so great as to indicate that no “reasona-
ble” state would leave it on the table, even if, technically speaking, states re-
tain the power to decline.103 The same might be true of offers to individuals. 
When an offeree accepts funds under these circumstances, the argument goes, 
such acceptance is not the product of voluntary choice. Rather, the position of 
the offeree is akin to that of a contracting party who says yes to a no-brainer.104 
Yet not all no-brainers are alike. An irresistible offer might be one that 
you accept eagerly because what you get in exchange is so valuable compared 
to what you give up.105 The situation is different, and the prospect of coercion 
becomes more salient, when an offer is made attractive by the offeree’s lack of 
promising alternatives. Volition as understood in this sense depends on both 
the asset being acquired and the offeree’s options if the deal falls through. 
Drawing the line can be excruciatingly difficult. Does a cash-strapped state 
really consent to the terms of an enticing federal grant? Does a police officer 
really consent to her department’s imposition of restrictions on her political 
speech? Does a building owner who wants to renovate really consent to the 
zoning board’s demand for a public easement? 
In exploring these questions, it is useful to draw lessons from the field of 
contract law, which the Supreme Court has invoked in its cases involving 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Berman, supra note 12, at 1347 (defining the use of coercion as “conditionally threatening 
what would be constitutionally wrongful to do”); Dale B. Thompson, “Unmistakably Clear” Coer-
cion: Finding a Balance Between Judicial Review of the Spending Power and Optimal Federalism, 50 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 589, 619 (2013) (proposing a rule that would invalidate a federal spending condi-
tion only when it is “unmistakably clear that [a condition] is coercive”). 
 101 See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 1428. 
 102 Berman, supra note 12, at 1287; see also Baker & Berman, supra note 28, at 518 (discussing a 
definition of coercion as an “antonym of sorts for freedom or voluntariness”). 
 103 See Berman, supra note 12, at 1295 (linking the concept of compulsion with the absence of 
any reasonable choice, rather than with the literal absence of any choice at all). 
 104 See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 577 (drawing an analogy to contract law); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (recognizing how an improper threat can 
render a contract voidable). 
 105 See Baker & Berman, supra note 28, at 533 (noting that states possess the power to choose 
between accepting and rejecting an offer, if the concept of choice is understood in the literal sense); cf. 
Kreimer, supra note 22, at 1300–01 (contrasting threats to make a citizen “worse off” with offers that 
“expand her range of options”). 
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states’ acceptance of federal funds.106 The common law of contract is predicat-
ed on voluntary assent.107 The importance of assent is reinforced by the availa-
bility of a duress defense to one who agrees to an offer only upon receiving a 
wrongful threat.108 The easy cases for duress are those involving physical 
threats, like the paradigmatic gun-to-the-head scenario. Much more delicate, 
and more pertinent to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, are cases that 
present the question whether duress can arise from the offeror’s threat not to 
deal with the offeree. 
Most of the time, an offeror may threaten not to deal with a party who re-
fuses the offeror’s terms. But there are situations in which the offeror’s un-
flinching insistence on its own terms can invite judicial scrutiny of the result-
ing deal.109 The challenge in contract law is figuring out which situations are 
which. The same is true of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. When the 
federal government offers a grant but only upon the states’ acceptance of oner-
ous conditions, is its proposal wrongful, or is it being a good steward of public 
resources? Does the size of the grant matter? Is it relevant how cash-strapped 
the states are or whether the threatened withholding relates to new money ra-
ther than funds the states already had been receiving? A theory of unconstitu-
tional conditions based on notions of coercion, volition, and duress needs to 
answer difficult questions like these. 
This is not to deny the possibility of a coherent doctrinal distinction be-
tween inducement and coercion. That distinction must reflect an understanding 
of what it means for an action to be voluntary and what it means for govern-
ment action to be wrongful.110 Developing such an account is a considerable 
undertaking, and one to which the Supreme Court has devoted relatively little 
attention. There is also a question of justification. If, for example, the federal 
government wishes to offer generous terms in hopes that states will promote 
certain policies, it is not obvious why it should matter whether the deal is 
merely very good rather than “too good to refuse.”111  
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation enacted 
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract.”); see also NFIB, 567 U.S. at 576–
77 (noting that the Court frequently views exercises of the spending power through the lens of con-
tract law). 
 107 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (recognizing the general rule that “the 
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange”). 
 108 See id. § 175(1) (noting the voidability of contracts that are infected by duress). 
 109 See id. § 176 cmt. f (explaining that while “a threat of refusal to deal with another party is 
ordinarily not duress,” there are exceptions). 
 110 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 12, at 1347 (linking the definition of coercion to the wrongful-
ness of the government’s threat). 
 111 Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 875 (2013) (recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing between “offers that a state 
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Even if an offeree is eager to make a deal based on the attractiveness of 
the terms, there remains an additional concern that the government could use 
inducements to circumvent constitutional limits on its authority. This is per-
haps easiest to see in the context of federal-state relations, for a state’s assent 
does not remove constitutional limits on federal power. A similar problem aris-
es when the government persuades a private citizen to refrain from exercising 
a personal liberty.112 Some individuals might genuinely prefer to relinquish 
some freedom in exchange for a benefit the government is offering. That 
choice, though, carries ramifications for the rest of society.113 We might worry 
about the aggregate diminution of liberty, and the corresponding expansion of 
government power, irrespective of whether individuals trade their rights volun-
tarily. Likewise, we might worry about distortion of the marketplace of ideas if 
the government is overzealous in subsidizing allies and buying off adver-
saries.114 The mechanisms are complex, but the broader point is simple: the 
dilution of private liberty creates public externalities. 
III. DEFINING LEVERAGE 
Given the complexity surrounding the coercion test, it is worth consider-
ing other ways to ground the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. A leading 
alternative—or, as Samuel Bagenstos has characterized it in an important arti-
cle, supplement115—to coercion is a concept that is explicit in some cases and 
in the background of numerous others: leverage, meaning the government’s 
use of a benefit to induce offerees to incur unrelated burdens. 
In the field of physics, leverage might characterize the use of a beam and 
fulcrum to move an object.116 The term has a related connotation in the world 
of finance, where it can refer to the use of debt to fund investments beyond the 
                                                                                                                           
cannot refuse, which are impermissible, and offers that are too good to refuse, which are acceptable 
and ubiquitous”). 
 112 See Hamburger, supra note 10, at 484 (noting that “although constitutional rights are personal 
in the sense that they belong to persons, they protect persons by limiting government”). 
 113 Cf. Epstein, supra note 11, at 29 (discussing externalities in the context of denials of corporate 
charters); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1042 
(2005) (discussing how some costs of speech restrictions are incurred by society at large); Kreimer, 
supra note 22, at 1340 (noting the dangers that government spending can create for the notion that the 
Constitution “reserve[s] certain areas of conduct to the untrammeled choice of citizens”). 
 114 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1616 
(2014). 
 115 See generally Bagenstos, supra note 111 (offering a sophisticated argument for linking coer-
cion and leverage in the Supreme Court’s case law). 
 116 See, e.g., Lever, A DICTIONARY OF PHYSICS (Jonathan Law & Richard Rennie eds., 8th ed. 
2019); Moments, Levers and Gears, BBC BITESIZE, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z242y4j/
revision/3 [https://perma.cc/VW4T-YUTC]. 
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investor’s commitment of capital.117 In both contexts, the power—and poten-
tial danger—of the lever is that it “multiplies force.”118 
Leverage plays a similar role in the legal lexicon. The term might apply to 
threats of criminal prosecution designed to affect civil proceedings119 or threats 
of anticompetitive conduct designed to affect commercial practices.120 Compa-
rable uses appear in the Supreme Court’s cases, which discuss government 
attempts at exploiting a benefit to influence unrelated conduct.121  
This Part examines the role of leverage in a variety of contexts, beginning 
with federal-state relations and proceeding to the implications for private actors.  
A. Leverage Against States 
In considering the dynamics of leverage, Dole is a useful starting point.122 
As noted above, the program in Dole linked the availability of federal highway 
funds to a state’s willingness to prohibit alcohol purchases by people younger 
than twenty-one.123 The Dole majority upheld the program as a lawful exercise 
of Congress’s spending power.124 It mentioned leverage concerns but dis-
missed them in short order, finding a close enough connection between the 
drinking age and the promotion of safe interstate travel.125 
The Dole Court did not attempt to “define the outer bounds” of the requi-
site connection between federal funds and programmatic objectives.126 Still, it 
accepted the degree of proximity as a component of the unconstitutional condi-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Emily Kehoe, Hedge Fund “Regulation” for Systemic Risk: Largely Impossible, 14 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 35, 57–58 (2013). 
 118 Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831, 841 
n.11 (2001). 
 119 See Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct: Reflections on Agreements to 
Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Criminal Charges, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 
929 (1988). 
 120 See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
515 (1985). On this and other uses of the concept of leverage in legal scholarship, see Jones, supra 
note 118, at 841 n.11. 
 121 See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2013) 
(recognizing a distinction between “conditions that define the limits of the government spending pro-
gram” and “conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the 
program itself”); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 606 (2013) (warning 
that the government may “not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental 
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 122 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 123 Id. at 205. 
 124 Id. at 212. 
 125 Id. at 211. 
 126 Id. at 208 n.3. 
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tions analysis. So did Justice O’Connor, who dissented on grounds that the 
asserted connection was too tenuous. She worried that without a tighter link 
between the purpose of a federal grant and the behaviors being incentivized, 
Congress could enlarge its powers—and diminish the autonomy of the states—
just by taking out its checkbook.127 
Similar concerns would arise some twenty-five years later in NFIB.128 
Recall that Congress sought to encourage the states to expand their Medicaid 
coverage by threatening to withdraw funding for existing Medicaid programs. 
That threat, the Court ruled, went too far. Seven Justices concluded that the 
design of the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional.129 Among them was 
Chief Justice Roberts, who explained that federal Medicaid funding represent-
ed over ten percent of many states’ budgets.130 But the problem was not simply 
magnitude.131 Congress had tethered funding for new behaviors—covering 
additional classes of patients—to the continued receipt of existing Medicaid 
funds.132 For Chief Justice Roberts, Congress went astray in bundling the old 
with the new.133 
The same focus, albeit on the way to a different conclusion, characterized 
Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent in NFIB.134 Justice Ginsburg saw the Medi-
caid expansion as an amendment of existing law.135 That depiction neutralized 
concerns about improper leverage.136 Congress has the power to revise its pro-
grams, and the states have the power to decline further participation if they 
find the changes too unpalatable.137 
Not every Justice in NFIB was so focused on whether the Medicaid ex-
pansion was a new program as opposed to the revision of an existing program. 
Justice Scalia concluded that the expansion was unconstitutional, but on a dif-
ferent rationale than the one set forth by Chief Justice Roberts.138 Justice Scalia 
relied on an “anticoercion principle” designed to preserve the federal-state bal-
ance by preventing Congress from encroaching on areas of state and local con-
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cern.139 To illustrate, he imagined a federal program offering “each State a 
grant equal to the State’s entire annual expenditures for primary and secondary 
education.”140 In order to qualify for that grant, a state would need to cede au-
tonomy to the federal government on matters such as educational curriculum 
and district boundaries. Justice Scalia offered this hypothetical as an example 
of federal intrusion upon traditional areas of state authority.141 
Noticeably absent from Justice Scalia’s illustration is the government’s 
use of leverage to exploit a benefit in order to encourage unrelated behavior. 
His hypothetical program is self-contained; the federal government is provid-
ing funds that are directly related to program goals. Even so, Justice Scalia 
used the scenario to exemplify federal overreach. 
Comparing the various opinions in NFIB distinguishes leverage concerns 
from worries about the exercise of government power per se. As Professor Ba-
genstos suggests, Chief Justice Roberts’s attention to whether the Medicaid 
expansion was a new program would be unnecessary if the amount of money 
on the line was dispositive.142 Unlike Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts 
treated the government’s use of leverage as carrying relevance beyond the 
magnitude of the benefit on offer. The federal government may encourage 
some behaviors that it cannot insist upon. But the Chief Justice’s opinion in 
NFIB demands a connection between what is offered and what is asked in re-
turn—the same connection the Court mentioned decades earlier in Dole.143 
B. Leverage Against Private Actors 
Running parallel to Dole and NFIB are cases in which a government—
federal or state—offers a benefit to a private actor in exchange for concessions. 
At first glance, these situations might seem worlds apart from disputes over the 
structure and implications of federalism. But the position of the states in cases 
like Dole and NFIB is conceptually similar to the position of, say, the public 
employee whose job depends on her willingness to curtail her speech, the non-
profit association that must limit its activities in order to remain eligible for 
sought-after funding, or the homeowner who receives permission to improve 
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her property only after she grants an easement. In each of these scenarios, the 
government acts through inducement rather than compulsion. Even so, the cas-
es evince a judicial commitment to preventing improper uses of leverage. 
1. Employment 
The obligations of government employees extend beyond the perfor-
mance of specified tasks. Employees must also tolerate restrictions on their 
liberty that arise by virtue of the employment relationship. In exchange, they 
receive opportunities for public service and professional development. And, of 
course, they receive the same benefit that states receive when they implement 
federal programs: money. 
The Supreme Court has identified limits on what government employers 
may demand from their employees, most prominently in litigation involving 
the First Amendment.144 It did not have to be this way. We can imagine a sys-
tem in which public employees have no First Amendment rights to assert 
against their employers. Justice Holmes did more than imagine this system; he 
endorsed it during his time on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
For Justice Holmes, a citizen who takes a job on the government’s payroll 
must accept that certain actions will put his employment status in jeopardy. 
While a citizen “may have a constitutional right to talk politics,” he “has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”145 Because no one forces you to accept 
a government paycheck, you cannot complain when it comes with strings at-
tached. 
The Supreme Court has rejected this conception of public employee 
rights. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Court has made clear that 
governments cannot force employees to relinquish the entirety of their liberty 
as the price of public employment.146 At the same time, it has recognized that 
the government’s operational objectives justify certain limitations on rights, 
including speech rights. Government offices, like private organizations, have 
goals to achieve, and if employee speech threatens to interfere with the pursuit 
of those goals, managers need discretion to respond.147 
The issue of coercion, prominent in the cases involving federal-state rela-
tions, plays a lesser role in controversies involving employee speech. The latter 
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body of law does not focus on whether an employee’s decision to work for the 
government is motivated by the lack of comparable employment opportunities 
elsewhere. Rather than grappling with notions of volition and constraint, the 
Court has constructed a doctrine that highlights the relationship between the 
government’s interest in controlling employee speech and the Constitution’s 
commitment to protecting expressive liberty.  
The framework that has emerged recognizes the prospect of First 
Amendment protection when an employee speaks on a matter of “public con-
cern,” as opposed to a matter of purely “personal interest.”148 For constitution-
al protection to attach, the employee also must have spoken outside the scope 
of her official duties.149 Only then is the government constrained in its mana-
gerial authority. The ultimate question becomes whether the employee’s inter-
est in speaking outweighs the employer’s interest in efficient operations.150 
Behind this doctrinal framework is a commitment to protecting the right 
of the speaker “as a citizen” notwithstanding his dual role as a government 
employee.151 The goal is to preserve expressive liberty while acknowledging 
that managers need some discretion to restrict speech if they are to accomplish 
their operational objectives. Teachers should be able to write to their local pa-
pers to comment on school policies.152 Staffers in a government office should 
be able to talk about current events with their colleagues.153 But prosecutors 
cannot claim constitutional protection when they stoke dissatisfaction among 
fellow employees about garden-variety workplace disputes.154 
Employee speech jurisprudence can sometimes look like its own, distinct 
subfield of constitutional law. But we can understand it as an instantiation of 
concerns about leverage. Speech that is made in discharge of an employee’s 
official duties or that impairs the function of the workplace relates directly to 
the operations of the government employer. The employer accordingly exercis-
es authority to control that speech. This control, however, does not affect the 
employee’s continued right to speak as a citizen on other matters of public 
concern, for the “First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to 
leverage the employment relationship to restrict . . . the liberties employees 
enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.”155 People who choose to work for 
the government sacrifice only those liberties that directly affect the pursuit of 
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managerial objectives. Other speech is too attenuated from the government’s 
operations to render it subject to restriction. 
Citizens bring their liberties with them when they show up for work. If 
the government wants to restrict those liberties, it needs to calibrate its ap-
proach to the operational rationale that justifies its heightened authority.156 Any 
restrictions that are disconnected from that rationale represent the improper use 
of leverage to affect speech that is too remote from the government’s pro-
grammatic goals. By contrast, speech restrictions that are tethered to bona fide 
operational concerns reduce the risk of improper leverage. They rest on a link 
between an employee’s speech and her employer’s managerial interests. A 
prosecutor’s office may discipline an employee who circulates incendiary sur-
veys to her colleagues, because those surveys pose a threat to intraoffice har-
mony.157 Likewise, the federal government may prohibit its employees from 
working on political campaigns, because political activity could create a per-
ception of bias that would sap public confidence and make it more difficult for 
government offices to achieve their objectives.158 
For related reasons, the President may take into account political affilia-
tion in selecting high-ranking officials,159 despite the fact that the government 
may not adopt a political litmus test as a hiring policy across public agencies 
and institutions. The President might reasonably conclude that a successful 
administration depends on installing like-minded people in key roles,160 
whereas political ideology generally bears far less on, say, a teacher’s ability to 
convey curricular information to students or a police officer’s ability to protect 
the public.  
The key, once again, is the degree of relatedness between what the gov-
ernment offers and what it asks in return. Even when the government wields a 
checkbook rather than a sword, it has no power to diminish rights that are dis-
connected from its operational objectives. 
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2. Education 
Just as public employees retain First Amendment rights at work,161 stu-
dents in public schools carry their expressive liberty with them when they pass 
through the “schoolhouse gate.”162 Treating students as “closed-circuit recipi-
ents of only that which the State chooses to communicate” would be incon-
sistent with the First Amendment as understood by the Supreme Court.163 
This does not mean students may say anything they wish without conse-
quence. Existing law recognizes the distinct nature of the school environment. 
Students give up some of their expressive autonomy pursuant to their matricu-
lation at public schools, for schools could not function if they operated by the 
same rules as the public square.164 
In explaining this distinction, the Supreme Court has accepted a premise 
akin to the one at the center of its public employee speech jurisprudence. 
While student speech generally is protected, it is subject to restriction if it 
threatens to disrupt school activities. That is the lesson of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, which protected students’ right to 
protest the Vietnam War by wearing armbands.165 The Court explained that the 
speech at issue had not “intrude[d] upon the work of the schools or the rights 
of other students.”166 In the absence of disruption, the Court worried that the 
school’s action was motivated by the “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”167 Suppressing 
speech on such grounds is unlawful, in the school context as in all others.168 
The Tinker doctrine is, first and foremost, about the expressive liberty of 
students and the disciplinary authority of schools. But viewed from a different 
angle, the case illustrates the dangers of leverage. The government may not 
condition the availability of public education on students’ relinquishment of all 
their speech rights. To do so would be to leverage a benefit in an effort to con-
trol unrelated behavior. Restrictions are justified only when there is a close 
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connection between student speech and school operations. Hence Tinker’s at-
tention to whether the speech at issue threatens to disrupt the government’s 
educational objectives. 
Developments in the law since Tinker follow the same pattern. The Su-
preme Court has ruled that a student’s liberty to speak at school does not in-
clude the right to use vulgar language.169 Permitting such language would un-
dermine an important function of public schools, which is to foster civility as 
part of an effective learning environment.170 More recently, the Court added 
that student speech is not protected if it constitutes nothing more than the pro-
motion of illegal drug use.171 In explaining its ruling, the Court accepted the 
judgment of political officials that “part of a school’s job is educating students 
about the dangers” posed by illegal drugs.172 Because the Court viewed the 
speech in question as implicating a legitimate operational objective, there were 
grounds for the imposition of discipline.173 
The corollary is that schools are prohibited from leveraging the benefit of 
a public education to restrict student speech that does not disrupt the classroom 
or detract from the educational mission. Students retain their rights to speak as 
citizens, in the same way that public employees retain their corresponding 
rights. Only when speech impairs the government’s operational objectives do 
additional restrictions become permissible. 
3. Grants 
The previous Sections discussed how leverage affects the lawfulness of 
government efforts to regulate employees and students. The same goes for cases 
involving monetary grants to individuals and organizations. 
A vivid illustration is Agency for International Development v. Alliance 
for Open Society International, Inc., decided in 2013.174 In combating the 
spread of HIV and AIDS, Congress sought to enlist the help of nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). It made grants available, but the cash came with 
conditions.175 NGOs could not use federal money to “promote or advocate the 
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legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.”176 Further, no NGO 
could receive funding unless it had “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution 
and sex trafficking.”177 Some NGOs challenged the second condition because 
they feared it would interfere with their efforts to build relationships and pro-
mote public health.178 
The obvious response for an NGO that was uncomfortable with the policy 
requirement was to turn down the federal money. After all, NGOs were not 
compelled to say yes to Congress; the choice was theirs. But the Supreme 
Court ruled that Congress could not put NGOs to such a choice. Though the 
Court recognized that the spending power allows Congress to limit the use of 
federal funds to specified purposes, it underscored that constitutional con-
straints remain.179 The pivotal distinction is between “conditions that define 
the limits of the government spending program” and those that “seek to lever-
age funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”180 
The policy requirement in Agency for International Development fell on 
the wrong side of the line. The requirement did not control what NGOs could 
do with public funds. Instead, it demanded that NGOs “pledge [their] alle-
giance” to a government-sanctioned policy.181 By making that demand, Con-
gress violated the First Amendment.182 
In explaining its conclusion, the Court relied on cases including its 1991 
decision in Rust v. Sullivan.183 The controversy in Rust involved congressional 
funding for organizations that provide family-planning services. The Secretary 
of Health and Human Services had promulgated regulations providing that 
program funds could not be used to support counseling on “abortion as a method 
of family planning.”184 No organization was required to accept federal money. 
But if it did, it had to comply with the conditions the government set out. 
Unlike the policy requirement in Agency for International Development, 
the restrictions in Rust passed constitutional muster.185 The difference was that 
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the condition in Rust related only to the use of money within the scope of the 
relevant program. An organization could receive federal funding even though it 
engaged in abortion-related counseling using money from other sources.186 The 
same was true of doctors who devoted some of their time to family planning 
services funded by the government. Those doctors had to abide by the gov-
ernment’s rules when conducting activities subsidized by government dollars. 
But they were free to disregard those limitations in their other professional and 
personal pursuits.187 
Given that the restrictions in Rust applied only to the use of program 
funds, there was no concern about improper leverage.188 The government was 
not utilizing a grant program to affect behavior outside the scope of that pro-
gram. It was placing conditions on the way that federal funds were spent.189 By 
limiting its conditions to the program it is administering, the government can 
avoid the improper use of leverage. When, by contrast, the government reaches 
beyond the bounds of a given program to influence other activities, leverage 
problems can arise.190 
4. Tax Benefits 
The government can improve the financial fortunes of its citizens by re-
ducing their tax bills just as it can by disbursing funds. Tax breaks resemble 
monetary grants as inducements for action, and they raise parallel concerns 
about the improper use of leverage. 
The Supreme Court considered the intersection of unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine and tax incentives in 1983 with Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation.191 The dispute in Regan involved a law denying certain tax ad-
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vantages to organizations engaged in political lobbying.192 The ensuing litiga-
tion raised a problem that by now is familiar. Tax advantages are valuable ben-
efits,193 but the federal government conditioned their availability on an organi-
zation’s willingness to curtail its expressive activities by limiting its lobbying. 
The Regan Court rebuffed the constitutional challenge and upheld the 
government’s rules. According to the Court, Congress made a legitimate 
choice to subsidize certain activities of nonprofit organizations through tax 
advantages.194 At the same time, Congress lawfully chose not to extend that 
subsidy to lobbying. This argument runs parallel with the rationale of Rust, in 
which the Court affirmed the government’s right to decide which activities to 
promote with public funds.195 
The Regan Court also juxtaposed the situation before it with a case from 
the mid-twentieth century in which California had made eligibility for certain 
property tax exemptions dependent on a pledge not to support the overthrow of 
the U.S. government.196 The resulting mismatch between benefit and burden 
found no counterpart in Regan, where the relevant tax rules merely reflected 
Congress’s determination of which activities it wished to subsidize and which 
it did not.197 What is more, an organization always retained the option of split-
ting itself into two affiliated entities, one that engaged in lobbying and one that 
refrained from doing so, in order to receive favorable tax treatment.198 The 
availability of that option underscored the limited domain in which the lobby-
ing restriction operated. 
At base, the Court viewed the rules in Regan as placing conditions on the 
use of a subsidy.199 Imposing constraints on the use of public resources is dif-
ferent from exploiting those resources to extract unrelated concessions.200 
Through its embrace of that distinction, Regan provides further evidence of the 
importance of leverage concerns to the operation of unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. 
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5. Land Use 
As we have seen, controversies over the use of conditions regularly arise 
in the context of expressive liberty. But the First Amendment has no monopoly 
on such disputes. Land use restrictions offer additional examples of how the 
government raises leverage concerns when it operates via inducement rather 
than compulsion. 
Consider a state coastal commission that agrees to give a pair of home-
owners permission to rebuild their house only if they grant the public an ease-
ment across part of their property.201 In one sense, this transaction is entirely 
voluntary; the owners retain the choice between rebuilding their property and 
leaving it be, depending on how much they value the rebuild and how much 
they dislike the notion of granting an easement. 
But technical voluntariness does not insulate the government’s action 
from scrutiny under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A reviewing 
court must also consider whether the condition advances a “legitimate police-
power purpose” that the state claims as justification for its action.202 Without 
this “essential nexus,” the condition is unlawful, just as it would be unlawful if 
a state “forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to 
those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.”203  
The nexus requirement provides a safeguard against the use of improper 
leverage. Permission to alter real property is something of value. Public offi-
cials may place conditions on the grant of such permission, but the conditions 
must relate to the reasons why the government regulates land use in the first 
place.204 Dispensing with the need for a connection between benefit and bur-
den would allow the government to exploit a discrete pocket of regulatory au-
thority in order to extract unrelated concessions. To validate such an approach 
could, in the extreme, amount to countenancing “an out-and-out plan of extor-
tion.”205 Only if there is harmony of purpose between the benefit the govern-
ment confers and the concession it extracts can we be confident that no threat 
of improper leverage is afoot.206  
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The homeowner asking for permission to improve her land is situated 
similarly to the employee hoping to retain her government job, the nonprofit 
organization applying for a grant, and even the state seeking to participate in a 
federal funding program. In each situation, the offeree could just walk away. 
But in each situation, the Supreme Court has treated the offeree’s power to 
refuse as only part of the story. There must also be an inquiry into the relation-
ship between what is offered and what is asked. 
There is no question that the government possesses authority to control the 
use of public assets and to pursue operational objectives. Yet public officials may 
not leverage a benefit—no matter how valuable—to achieve incongruent ends. 
IV. THEORIZING LEVERAGE 
Despite the prominence of leverage concerns in some decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the case law lacks a robust theoretical account of why leverage 
is problematic. Without a clear view of the conceptual foundations of the in-
quiry into leverage, discussions of the requisite connection between benefits 
and burdens can seem mysterious, incomplete, and even ad hoc.207 To deter-
mine the degree of proximity that is required between a government benefit 
and a condition placed upon it, we need to know why proximity is important—
and why remoteness is cause for concern. 
Even if one believes that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is valid 
in some of its applications and that the offeree’s purported assent does not au-
tomatically neutralize constitutional concerns, there is an argument that courts 
should not worry about the mixing of unlike benefits and burdens. “[P]ackage 
deals,”208 the theory goes, are no different from conditions that relate directly 
to the permitted uses of a public benefit. In either situation, we might recog-
nize the need for constitutional limits. But those limits should not depend on 
the relationship between what is offered and what is asked. Leverage concerns 
can seem inapposite to the extent that the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions invokes principles of contract law,209 which do not demand similarity 
between goods and services being exchanged.210 
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The Sections that follow respond to this argument by examining the po-
tential foundations of leverage as a constitutional concept. The Sections ana-
lyze five related but distinct theories for grounding leverage concerns as a mat-
ter of constitutional law: 
• Leverage facilitates overreach by enabling public officials to operate in 
ways that diminish liberty. 
• Leverage reduces the transparency of government programs and inhibits 
public scrutiny. 
• Leverage degrades the political process by robbing official action of its 
internal coherence. 
• Leverage undermines political equality due to individuals’ differing levels 
of dependence on public benefits. 
• When the federal government offers a benefit to the states, leverage raises 
federalism concerns by disrupting the federal-state balance. 
Some of these theories reflect process-based considerations focused on 
the manner in which the government carries out its initiatives. Others seek to 
identify actions that are off-limits regardless of the procedures the government 
employs.211 By comparing and contrasting various conceptions of leverage, I 
hope to provide a framework that can inform discussions about the legality of 
government inducements. 
A. Overreach 
Perhaps the most salient concern about leverage is that public authorities 
might mix benefits and burdens in a manner that violates constitutional limita-
tions on the government’s lawful domain.212 By pushing back against attempts 
to use public benefits to manipulate unrelated conduct, the judiciary provides a 
check against overreach. 
This argument begins by recognizing that the imposition of conditions is 
the exercise of power. When the government dictates the terms upon which 
benefits are available, it alters behavior through official action. That this action 
does not take the form of criminal prohibition or direct regulation is beside the 
point. It remains a potent means of wielding authority.213 
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There are two ways in which the use of leverage threatens to transgress 
constitutional limits on the province of government. The first pertains to the 
federal government and the relationship between Congress’s spending power 
and other features of the constitutional blueprint. As we have seen, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted Article I’s spending power as a self-contained font 
of congressional authority. There is no requirement that Congress be acting in 
furtherance of another enumerated power. And though spending must promote 
the general welfare,214 the judiciary defers to congressional constructions of 
that term.215 
Notwithstanding Congress’s broad authority to impose conditions, the 
leveraging of public benefits to influence unrelated conduct raises concerns. 
When Congress enacts a funding program and specifies the way in which re-
cipients may use grants, it engages in deliberate spending under the auspices of 
Article I. Things are more complicated when Congress uses a grant to affect 
other behavior. By definition, leveraged conditions are a step removed from 
the funds to which they attach. The conceptual gap can make leveraged condi-
tions look less like spending and more like regulation.216 That characterization 
presents a problem, because the Article I spending power is not a power to 
regulate.217 
Rather than saddling a benefit with unrelated conditions, Congress may 
use its spending power to create a different program to which the conditions 
really are relevant. Alternatively or in addition, Congress may base the condi-
tions on an independent source of authority such as the power to regulate inter-
state commerce.218 What Congress may not do, the argument goes, is obviate 
the need for such action by linking conditions to unrelated public benefits.219 
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The Constitution creates a federal government of limited powers.220 Using the 
Spending Clause as an engine of regulation calls the limits into question.221 
There is a related concern that applies to federal and state actors alike. By 
linking public benefits with unrelated burdens, a government might threaten 
liberties that the Constitution protects from official intrusion. The First 
Amendment cases provide useful illustrations. The government may direct that 
doctors are prohibited from advising patients about abortion within the con-
fines of a federally funded program.222 Yet it would undermine the First 
Amendment’s resistance to official orthodoxy if the government could impose 
that type of restriction outside the scope of a federal program. The prohibition 
against leverage prevents the government from circumventing constitutional 
limitations simply by packaging assets in a particular way. 
Likewise, if the government offers grants to nonprofit organizations, it 
may control how those organizations use the funds. But the government cannot 
leverage its grants to reach unrelated activities it has no constitutional authority 
to regulate. That explains why the Supreme Court invalidated a condition lim-
iting certain federal funds to organizations that had a policy reflecting the gov-
ernment’s views on prostitution and sex trafficking.223 If the government at-
tempted to compel the adoption of such a policy through the criminal laws, its 
action surely would violate the First Amendment. When the government pur-
sued the same goal indirectly by imposing a condition, its action met the same 
fate.224 A similar story unfolded decades earlier when the government used the 
allure of public funds to prevent broadcasters from any editorializing, even 
editorializing supported by private donations.225 
The prohibition against leverage strikes a balance between respecting the 
government’s need to steward its resources and preserving the integrity of the 
Constitution’s structural safeguards and individual liberties. The government 
may control how public funds are spent, but not how recipients conduct them-
selves in other respects.226 The prohibition against leverage ensures that the 
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federal government remains one of limited powers and that public officials 
give due regard to individual liberty even when they dispense benefits.227  
The government may not make the receipt of public funds contingent on 
an organization’s embrace of a particular orthodoxy.228 Nor may it tether tax 
advantages to a loyalty oath.229 The government also lacks power to forbid all 
employee speech on public controversies, for such action carries too high a 
risk of punishing disfavored views.230 Ditto when a principal punishes a stu-
dent for political commentary that poses no real threat of disrupting the school 
environment.231 In all of these situations, the mismatch between benefit and 
burden suggests that the government is not merely stewarding resources and 
pursuing operational objectives.232 Instead, it is using conditions to achieve 
impermissible ends.  
The case law leaves no doubt that the government can bring about certain 
actions through inducements that it cannot compel directly.233 This is perfectly 
understandable, and even unavoidable. Public officials need more leeway 
when they spend funds than when they act as sovereign regulators of private 
conduct. Absent that leeway, it would be impracticable to pursue operational 
objectives like the efficient operation of public agencies and instrumentalities. 
When the government imposes conditions that do not relate to the use of 
public assets, its justification for exercising additional discretion disappears. 
This remains the case even if the conditions affect behavior that the govern-
ment might lawfully have influenced if it took a different approach. Imagine 
that the majority in South Dakota v. Dole concluded, as Justice O’Connor did 
in her dissent, that a state’s drinking age is not sufficiently connected to high-
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way funds to validate a federal program linking the two.234 In that scenario, it 
would not have mattered whether the federal government theoretically could 
have designed a different program with a tighter link between benefit and bur-
den—for example, a public-health initiative focused on reducing alcoholism. It 
is not enough that the government might have pursued its goal in other, lawful 
ways. The question is the lawfulness of the means the government actually 
employed. 
The Court’s recent engagement with the Affordable Care Act underscores 
the point.235 There is no doubt that Congress had the power to provide addi-
tional Medicaid funding to states that agreed to expand their coverage. In addi-
tion, it seems quite likely that Congress has the power to reduce or eliminate 
Medicaid funds that currently are available to the states.236 The problem Chief 
Justice Roberts identified in NFIB was not that the Act pursued an impermissi-
ble end, but that it employed impermissible means. Congress linked the con-
tinued availability of existing Medicaid funds to a program expansion.237 Irre-
spective of whether the federal government had the power (a) to make extra 
funds available to states that expanded their coverage, or (b) to diminish or 
eliminate existing Medicaid funding as a general matter, it stumbled by using 
the threat of reduced funding to achieve an expansion of coverage. 
Government overreach remains a problem even when it occurs with 
someone’s consent. The Supreme Court has explained that preserving the re-
spective domains of federal and state sovereignty protects the liberty of the 
people.238 The Court scrutinizes the lawfulness of government action even 
when a state wishes to accede to a federal demand, so as to ensure that indi-
viduals do not suffer by implication.239 Moreover, while agreements between 
governments and private actors may be enforceable even when they limit indi-
vidual rights,240 a generalized notion of consent does not insulate every action 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See 483 U.S. 203, 215 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the asserted relation-
ship was “attenuated or tangential”). 
 235 See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 558. 
 236 See id. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissent-
ing in part) (stating that “Congress could have recalled the existing legislation, and replaced it with a 
new law making Medicaid as embracive of the poor as Congress chose”). 
 237 See id. at 585 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 238 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (observing that “the Constitu-
tion divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals”). 
 239 See id. at 182 (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States . . . the departure 
from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”). 
 240 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (per curiam); see also Sunstein, supra note 
93, at 607 (describing the connection between confidentiality agreements and the government’s man-
agerial interest). 
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of public officials from inspection, whether in the context of employment,241 
education,242 taxation,243 land use,244 or otherwise. 
By restricting officials’ ability to leverage public benefits to affect unrelated 
conduct, the judiciary redirects government action to its proper channels. A “cur-
rency”245 is valuable only to the extent it can be used to obtain desired goods and 
services. So it goes with public resources. The government may encourage cer-
tain behaviors through the promise of advantages or the removal of obstacles. To 
the extent public benefits are unrestricted in their available uses—to the extent, 
in other words, that they act as universal currency—the government accrues 
more power. By contrast, when the government faces meaningful limits on when 
and how it may exercise the powers it possesses, those powers are con-
strained.246 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ensures that the govern-
ment may not use every asset it controls for any purpose it desires. 
B. Transparency 
When the government makes public resources available but limits how 
they may be used, the dynamics of the proposed transaction can be fairly clear. 
If the offeree, whether a state or a private party, values the resources enough to 
tolerate the attendant limits, a deal will be struck.247 The preferences of the 
offeror and offeree will then be available for public inspection and scrutiny. 
The analysis can change when the government leverages a benefit to af-
fect unrelated behavior.248 To illustrate, compare two scenarios, which are in-
spired by and derived in part from then-Professor Sullivan’s important analysis 
of unconstitutional conditions.249 In the first scenario, Congress offers $10 mil-
lion to any state that pledges to use the money to raise awareness about the 
dangers of opioid abuse. States that receive funding must submit biweekly re-
ports to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration describing their expendi-
tures and evaluating the impact of their communications. In the second scenar-
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io, Congress rolls out the same program, but it adds another condition: partici-
pating states must also reduce carbon emissions from government buildings. 
The political calculus in the first scenario is relatively straightforward. A 
state must decide whether the benefits likely to flow from the communication 
campaign are greater than the burdens associated with preparing and submit-
ting regular reports to the federal government. The calculus might also include 
related considerations that deal with more abstract matters, such as the federal-
ism implications of acquiescing in Congress’s demands. Each state will evalu-
ate these factors and make a decision about whether to participate in the feder-
al program. Residents of each state, in turn, will be able to assess their offi-
cials’ decision and reach their own conclusions about whether it was correct.250 
The second scenario introduces more uncertainty. Now the question for 
each state is not whether the burdens of regular reporting outweigh the benefits 
likely to flow from heightened efforts to raise awareness about opioid addic-
tion. The inclusion of an unrelated burden—namely, restriction of carbon 
emissions—inserts another variable into the equation. A state must now think 
through the costs and benefits of limiting its emissions. It must then take the 
product of that analysis and weigh it against the net benefits of accepting fed-
eral funds to combat opioid abuse. This added complexity arguably reduces the 
transparency of the federal program, making it more difficult for the residents 
of a given state to evaluate whether their representatives acted wisely in ac-
cepting or declining federal funds.251 
The prohibition against leverage offers a response. By limiting the use of 
leverage, the judiciary potentially makes it easier for stakeholders and onlook-
ers to understand and evaluate the program, the tradeoffs, and the soundness of 
their representatives’ conclusions. Political deal-making remains perfectly 
permissible, of course. But when a legislative bargain directly affects constitu-
tional liberties or fundamental structural precepts, a disconnect between bene-
fit and burden can tip off the courts that a closer look is warranted. 
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C. Coherence 
In the realm of private contracting, mutually agreed exchange of dissimi-
lar assets is commonplace.252 Two willing parties are perfectly free to design a 
deal that involves the exchange of “landscaping equipment” for “a baseball 
ticket,” despite the lack of any connection between those two items other than 
the contract itself.253 There is no norm of likeness that constrains the modali-
ties of private exchange.254 If there were, societal gains from voluntary transac-
tions could be diminished. 
As applied to government conditions, this logic suggests that the mixing 
of unlike benefits and burdens is benign.255 Requiring a close connection be-
tween a government benefit and the behavior sought in exchange might be “in-
efficient” in “block[ing] bargains that both the government and the other party 
would truly prefer.”256 The safeguard is consent. So long as each party volun-
tarily agrees to the bargain, the objects of the transaction are beside the point. 
After all, the ultimate aim is worthy: to allow the government to make trades 
that benefit it (which is to say, the public), so long as the other parties to those 
trades also believe they will end up better off. 
There is good reason to question whether this principle of private ex-
change applies in like fashion to the domain of government conditions. The 
government arguably has an obligation to pursue internal coherence in its ac-
tions—an obligation private parties do not face. Such an aspiration of coher-
ence would seek to assure the public that the government is behaving rational-
ly and reasonably.257 If Congress enacts a ban on handguns in the District of 
Columbia, the public may safely assume that a majority of legislators decided 
that the benefits of the ban outweigh the costs. If the Environmental Protection 
Agency sets emission standards at a particular level, the public may safely as-
sume a comparable determination on the part of the agency. That also goes for 
benefit programs. There is an evident rationale behind a federal program that 
provides grants to the states only if, for example, they agree to use the money 
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to improve the energy efficiency of public buildings. The program may be a 
good idea or it may be a bad idea, but in either case it is coherent. 
Some may view this ideal of coherence as jeopardized by the govern-
ment’s mixing and matching of incentives with unrelated burdens. To draw 
again on examples offered by then-Professor Sullivan, consider a federal law 
that provides money to states to support innovations that reduce carbon emis-
sions, but that makes those funds dependent on the states’ agreement to enact 
certain laws related to abortion.258 The mismatch between the incentives and 
the requested behaviors arguably demonstrates a lack of internal coherence. 
That does not mean members of Congress were irrational in how they drafted 
the law. To take just one possibility, the explanation might be that some legisla-
tors were lukewarm about the environmental initiative but deeply committed to 
the abortion laws. Omnibus bills are commonplace,259 and they provide oppor-
tunities for legislators to vote in favor of others’ preferred initiatives in seeking 
to command support for their own causes. 
For better or worse, these tradeoffs and compromises are central to the 
federal legislative process. But coherence issues remain salient as applied to 
conditions on government benefits. In the example linking funds for environ-
mentally friendly initiatives with abortion laws, it is difficult to impute to Con-
gress any clear judgment about either the appropriate degree of investment in 
reducing pollution or the correct approach to regulating abortion.260 What we 
have instead, one might contend, is a failure of the legislative process to reflect 
“reasoned public deliberation.”261 
These concerns about incoherence overlap to some extent with the issues 
of transparency and accountability discussed in the previous Section.262 The 
passage of omnibus laws can constrain the executive, who might favor the 
general thrust of legislation but object to some of its ancillary features.263 For 
related reasons, leveraged spending programs arguably make it more difficult 
to impute a rational calculus to either the offeror or the offeree. 
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Arguments from coherence rest on an implied premise about how the 
government ought to function. As noted, this view is in tension with the reali-
ties of federal omnibus legislation (though perhaps less so with respect to 
states that follow a “single subject rule”).264 The legislative process is the do-
main of deal-cutting and compromise, and its variables are not limited to any 
particular subject. If one views this state of affairs as regrettable, at least as 
applied to spending programs, judicially enforced coherence might be a wel-
come respite. If, on the other hand, one is unbothered by omnibus action even 
when it relates to the provision of benefits, the coherence justification for pro-
hibiting leverage carries less force. In the latter event, the question would be-
come whether the other grounds for restricting leverage, including the issues of 
overreach and transparency discussed above and the other potential concerns 
whose discussion will follow, are sufficient to warrant skepticism. 
D. Equality 
Conditions on government benefits can diminish liberty even if people 
accept them voluntarily. When different people have varying levels of depend-
ence on government benefits, conditions may also distort “the distribution of 
rights in the polity as a whole.”265 Among the potential functions of the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine is to neutralize the resulting threat to political 
equality.266 
The concern is that through the use of conditions, the government might 
create—even if by no design of its own—something like a “constitutional 
caste” by extracting substantial concessions from those who are especially re-
liant on public benefits.267 Others, in light of their means or status, might have 
greater ability to turn down government offers and retain their liberty in undi-
luted form.268 For example, under existing law government employees relin-
quish some of their expressive liberty by virtue of working for the govern-
ment.269 Yet not all public employees are situated the same way. Their respec-
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tive degrees of reliance on government employment might vary based on their 
economic, educational, and social circumstances. Some employees have more 
power than others to reject onerous conditions by finding a different job. 
This disparity is troubling, but it is unavoidable. Offerees have differing 
levels of dependence on the benefits the government is offering, just as parties 
have differing degrees of bargaining power in the world of private contracting. 
So long as the government concerns itself with influencing behavior that bears 
on legitimate programmatic objectives, one might conclude that the distribu-
tional consequences are tolerable, even if unfortunate. But the situation is ar-
guably different when the government allocates benefits based on criteria that 
reach beyond its programmatic goals. In those cases, there is a risk that the 
government is using leverage to reward favored groups or punish disfavored 
ones, all to the detriment of political equality. 
To borrow from Seth Kreimer, it is one thing for the National Endowment 
for the Arts (NEA) to subsidize cubists but not pointillists based on aesthetic 
judgments about the relative virtue of different genres of painting. It is quite 
another thing for the NEA to subsidize Democrat painters but not Republican 
painters. The difference is that party affiliation has nothing to do with artistic 
skill.270 The government’s approach in the latter scenario serves either to re-
ward favored viewpoints and penalize disfavored ones, or to encourage artists 
to rethink or repress their opinions in order to qualify for funding. In either 
case, the government is dispensing benefits based on criteria that are divorced 
from the objectives of the program in question. Moreover, it is doing so in a 
manner that is likely to have the greatest impact on people who have the worst 
alternative options. The effect is to diminish political equality, providing an-
other possible basis for skepticism of the government’s use of leverage to in-
fluence conduct beyond a given program’s bounds. 
E. Federalism 
Two of the Supreme Court’s most intriguing engagements with leverage 
came in Dole271 and NFIB.272 Both cases involved attempts by the federal gov-
ernment to influence the actions of the states. Attempts of that sort raise unique 
concerns for the respective roles of the federal government and the states in the 
constitutional framework.  
As Chief Justice Roberts has observed, the states are sovereign, and they 
sometimes must “act like it,” even if that means turning down federal mon-
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ey.273 Nevertheless, some federal initiatives go too far. Consider the attempted 
Medicaid expansion in NFIB. Rather than simply offering to pay for the states’ 
expansion of coverage, the federal government threatened to remove funding 
the states were already receiving.274 This approach posed a problem, above and 
beyond the substantial amount of money on the line.275 When Congress offers 
money to the states in exchange for their implementation of a federal program, it 
is up to the states to decline if they wish.276 Yet the choice put to the states may 
be especially worrisome if rejecting the offer entails losing something more. 
Viewed from this perspective, mixing and matching on the part of the 
federal government may evince a lack of respect for the autonomy of the 
states.277 If Congress acts as though its creation of one program gives it vast 
authority to control the states’ pursuit of other objectives, it arguably shows too 
little regard for state sovereignty. Limiting the use of leverage constrains a fed-
eral spending power that might otherwise extend, at least under modern inter-
pretations, to an endless array of goals and projects.278 To preserve the Consti-
tution’s balance of federal and state power, the judiciary must scrutinize at-
tempts at “bringing federal economic might to bear on a State’s own choices of 
public policy.”279 
If the federal government can buy whatever authority it cannot seize, the 
idea of limited powers is difficult to maintain.280 By guarding against the use 
of leverage, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions helps to ensure that the 
“two-government system established by the Framers” does not “give way to a 
system that vests power in one central government.”281 In so doing, the doc-
trine respects the Constitution’s structure and vindicates its ultimate aim of 
protecting liberty.282 
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F. Implications 
The preceding Sections examined several potential theories for grounding 
the prohibition against leverage. Some of the theories are context-specific. For 
example, worries about distributional equality are most acute in the govern-
ment’s interactions with individuals and groups, whereas federalism issues are 
most salient in interactions between the federal government and the states.283 
Other theories, such as the vision of unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a 
safeguard against government overreach, operate whether the offeror is the 
federal government or a state. Taken in combination, these arguments seek to 
explain why it matters if the government is mixing benefits with unlike bur-
dens. 
The foregoing theories also provide a framework for analyzing disputes 
over the government’s use of conditions. It is not enough to say conditions 
must be related or germane to the programs to which they attach. Specifying 
the requisite degree of connection requires an account of why, exactly, lever-
age is problematic as a constitutional matter. Only with the conceptual founda-
tions in view can the jurisprudence of unconstitutional conditions develop in a 
sound, intelligible fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Constitution places limits on a government’s imposition of condi-
tions even when its counterparties willingly agree. That is the driving principle 
behind the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This Article has analyzed 
the doctrine as it relates to concerns over the use of leverage. Across a range of 
contexts, the Supreme Court has noted the need for some connection between 
the benefits the government offers and the concessions it seeks in return. By 
viewing those cases in combination and exploring their conceptual founda-
tions, we can take a step forward in understanding the operation and trajectory 
of unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
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